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The Japanese and Italian Silk Industry in the Late 
Nineteenth to Early Twentieth Centuries:  
How One’s Rise Affected the Other1
Introduction
Understanding the development of the Japanese silk industry is imperative, as this 
industry pioneered the modern factory system, implemented the concept of 
corporations, management, and finance, thereby building a foundation for successive 
nationwide economic development. Raw silk became the major export item after 
Japan resumed trade with the outside world in 1859. 2  In the Meiji and Taisho eras 
(1868-1926), exporting raw silk continued to be successful, always exceeding 20% of 
total Japanese exports. 3  Additionally, Japan commanded over 80% of market share in 
the global raw silk market by the 1930s, having starting from a modest 9.3% during 
1859-62. 4  The foreign currency obtained through exporting silk set the foundation 
for stable economic development, through restraining the outflow of specie while at 
the same time limiting the potential entry of foreign capital.  5  Without the 
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achievements of the silk industry, it is debatable whether Japan could have joined 
and remained in the league of developed countries, even its independence. Hence, 
there are ample definitive studies on various aspects of the Japanese silk industry, 
ranging from technological, managerial, and sociological to finance. 6  Yet, there is 
limited scholarly literature comparing the development of the Japanese silk industry 
with that of other countries.
This article investigates the successes and limitations of the pre-war Japanese silk 
industry by analyzing the impact that Japan’s rise had on its Italian counterpart. 7  By 
contrasting Italy and Japan, this paper attempts to highlight the repercussions in 
each country upon each other to achieve a sharpened historical understanding within 
the silk industry in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. From the earliest 
days, Italy had been the proven leader in producing silk; however, faced with 
competition from Japan in the late nineteenth century, the Italian silk industry had to 
transform itself. On the contrary, Japan continued to advance in areas where Italy 
retreated. It is the purpose of this study to provide a comparative perspective in 
business history to provoke a stronger and clearer factual narrative. When done well, 
historical evidence illuminates aspects that are dimmed by a merely single country 
analysis.
This paper is driven by a conviction that a dialogue with the past is worth 
pursuing. How did an unremarkable indigenous industry dominate the global market 
and subsequently sharply decline? I am also interested in the role of finance since 
funding of the silk industry was among the first important financial endeavors that 
aimed to finance a particular industry. Japanese banks and wholesale merchants 
played a critically important role in in providing funds to purchase silk cocoon, a 
crucial aspect of silk reeling. They provided the working capital much needed at that 
time. In Italy, however, providing such type of specialized financing did not 
materialize. Was the difference between the two countries the result of a lack of 
financial expertise? Or was it a result of major changes happening in the industry?
These questions led me to a deeper analysis of the Japanese silk industry, 
approaching it from a broader perspective. As we shall see, the Italian banks did not 
6 Representative works include Kazuo Yamaguchi, ed., Nihon sangyō kin’yū shi kenkyū-seishi kin’yū hen [The 
history of financing of Japanese Industries: Financing of silk reeling] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1966); 
Kanji Ishii, Nihon sanshigyō shi bunseki [An analysis of the history of Japan’s sericulture industry] (Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press, 1972).
7 In this paper, Italy shall mean the Lombardia (Lombardy) region when discussing about the silk industry, 
unless otherwise noted.
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provide specialized financing to the silk reeling manufacturers because this segment 
of the silk industry became obsolete through the increased competition from the 
Japanese market. As Italy industrialized and faced increases in wages, the abundant 
supply of inexpensive labor—once their competitive advantage—disappeared. In turn, 
the Italians moved to areas of the silk industry that were not yet threatened by the 
Japanese, such as silk throwing and weaving. As Japan leveraged its comparative 
advantage—cheap labor—by focusing on the production of raw silk, Italy moved on. 
Therefore, we ask: did Japan foresee and prepare for the changes coming ahead while 
simultaneously enjoying being the top raw silk exporter in the world?
The article is organized as follows. Section one provides an overview of the 
processes of manufacturing silk fabric and how it was financed in Japan and Italy. 
Section two investigates the competitive advantages in the silk industry in both 
countries. Section three analyzes how Italy responded to Japan’s rise. We conclude 
and seek implications in section five.
1.　Overview of the Silk Industry
1.1　Value Chain
Let us step back a moment in order to comprehend the entire process of producing 
silk fabrics using a value chain framework. 8  It takes seven distinctive steps to 
produce silk fabrics: silkworm rearing (allevamento del baco), reeling (trattura), silk 
throwing (torcitura), weaving (tessitura), dyeing (tintoria), printing (stampa), and 
finishing (finissaggio). In addition, measurements and tests (controlli e misure) are 
conducting during these processes. 9  As seen in Figure 1, raw silk constitutes one 
process in the value chain of producing silk fabrics. Although it is often perceived 
that Japan was successful in producing silk, its success was limited to producing raw 
silk, specifically silkworm rearing and silk reeling. As mentioned earlier, when Japan 
ascended in producing raw silk, Italy descended in that corresponding area to focus 
on different elements of the silk industry, namely silk throwing and weaving.
8 For a general description of the value chain, see Porter, M. E., The Competitive Advantage: Creating and 
Sustaining Superior Performance. (New York: Free Press, 1985).
9 The following descriptions of the manufacturing process is drawn from Carlotta Bianchi, Fabio Cani, Ester 
Geraci, and Bruna Masciadri, Il Museo didattico della Seta di Como (NodoLibri: Como, 2003).
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1.1.1.　Silkworm rearing: Producing silk cocoons 10
In the silkworm rearing stage, sericulturists grow silkworms from eggs to produce 
cocoons. The silkworm only eats mulberry leaves, which it swallows constantly, 
without chewing, until it finishes growing and reaches the fifth stage of 
metamorphosis. Such a process required a great deal of manual work as the 
silkworms were fed constantly. This task traditionally involved the entire family, and 
every able member of the household joined in the work. For the next stage, a 
cocoonery was prepared in which the silkworms formed their cocoons. The cocoon 
was placed in a dry oven to kill the pupae inside before being shipped for sale.
1.1.2.　Reeling: Producing raw silk 11
To obtain the silk, it was necessary to unwind the long filament that made the 
cocoon. It was an exhausting and complex task that had to be done quickly in difficult 
conditions, with the workers’ hands immersed in hot water. Most work was often 
done by young women who labored for up to 15 hours a day for extremely low 
wages. First, the cocoons were immersed in hot water in a basin to soften the sericin 
(the “glue” holding the floss silk together). Then, the beginning of the filament would 
be identified with the help of a brush and passed to the reeler who then combined 
several silk filaments in order to obtain the exact size desired by the buyer. The silk 
filaments produced in the basins was then collected on reels, while repairing any 
breaks in the filaments with tiny knots, and then finally bundled as hanks. The 
product at this stage was called “raw silk”.
10 Ibid., 83-92.
11 Ibid., 95-100.
Figure 1: Value Chain of the Silk Industry
Source: made by author based on Carlotta Bianchi, Fabio Cani, Ester 
Geraci, and Bruna Masciadri, Il Museo didattico della Seta di Como.
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1.1.3.　Throwing: Making silk threads 12
Raw silk, still fragile, had to be processed further before being dyed and woven. 
The act of throwing produces threads with cohesion and resistance and prevents the 
filaments from separating. By varying the number of twists and re-twisting threads, 
yarns are obtained that are more soft and shiny. The (raw) silk is first wound by 
spinning it around bobbins so that it can be processed further. Then the bobbins 
would be rewound to remove impurities such as dirt, coarse threads, and broken 
ends. The next operation, known as doubling, consisted of combining several threads 
of raw silk, or threads already twisted once, from several bobbins, to form a single 
yarn. The various threads had to be kept perfectly parallel and at the same tension. 
This complex process was done by machines as early as the 14th century in Bologna, 
where hydraulic power was used to wind and twist the threads. The silk throwing 
machines became more sophisticated with modifications and improvements, enabling 
simultaneous twisting of thread from hundreds of bobbins on multiple levels. These 
mills were considered to exemplify the highest level of technology known in Europe 
before the steam engine, and were a precursor to the factory system of the Industrial 
Revolution.
12 Ibid., 105-112.
Figure 2: Model of Bolognese Silk Throwing Machine (17th century)
Source: Museo del Partimonio Industriale, Bologna. Website (retrieved 




1.1.4.　Weaving: Forming the fabric 13
Weaving involves the task of interlacing longitudinal threads (the warp) and 
transverse threads (the weft). This is done using a loom. Because the process of 
weaving is complicated, it had been a battleground for innovation since before the 
pre-Roman era. Many inventors, including Leonardo da Vinci, strived to mechanize 
the process for maximum efficiency. 14
A major breakthrough occurred at the beginning of the 19th century with the 
invention of the Jacquard system in France, which was quickly adapted by the 
Italians. With this type of loom, the weaving of the patterned fabric is determined by 
a series of perforated cards that use a binary code to control the lifting of the warp 
threads. A hooked needle, which moves a single warp thread, can thus be lifted 
through each card table. By the end of the 19th century, weaving had become fully 
automated with the development of mechanical looms.
1.1.5.　Other Processes 15
During the production of filament, yarn, and fabric, various forms of silk must be 
repeatedly tested to determine their fundamental characteristics and to ensure 
quality. Thus, sophisticated technology in measuring the weight, torsion (twist), 
13 Carlotta Bianchi et al., Il Museo didattico della Seta di Como, 115-129.
14 Flavio Crippa, who generously shared his knowledge of history of the Italian silk industry, designed the 
operational model using the drawings of Leonardo in Figure 3. It is proudly displayed at the Museo Nazionale 
della Scienza e della Tecnologia “Leonardo da Vinci” (INV. 12593).
15 Carlotta Bianchi et al., Il Museo didattico della Seta di Como, 131-179.
Figure 3: Mechanical loom designed by Leonardo da Vinci (1495-1496)
Source: Museo Nazionale della Scienza e della Tecnologia “Leonardo 
da Vinci” (INV. 12593). Website (retrieved January 3, 2017): http://
www.museoscienza.org/english/leonardo/invenzioni/telaio.asp
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strength as well as regularity and cleanliness of the silk were developed in 
laboratories. Furthermore, methods and techniques for dyeing, printing, and finishing 
were developed and employed. Such evaluation methods demanded scientific research 
and development as well as professional training.
2.　Financing the Silk Industry
Japan did not have a competitive edge on the entire value chain. The development 
of the Japanese silk industry was specific and limited to silk reeling. In fact, Japan, 
and its major Asian rival, China, were “hopelessly backwards” in the subsequent 
stages of the value chain. 16  This handicap existed primarily because Japan lacked 
the technology in silk throwing and weaving that enabled mechanization. Japan did 
not possess the needed technology for the downstream process of silk manufacturing 
capable of generating more value through effective methods. Arguably, this technical 
deficiency was a result of the long period of national seclusion in Japan. The transfer 
of technology, including by means of “industrial spying”, in manufacturing silk has 
been surprisingly global, at least since the sixth century. 17  Because silk was one of 
the most precious items that could be traded, there had been much interaction 
between traders, dating back to ancient times. Along with the product, the 
technology was traded, bought and occasionally stolen by brute force between the 
West and East powers. Italy accumulated such knowledge and expertise while Japan 
did not particularly during the period of national seclusion. 18  Although silk reeling 
required innovation, the bulk of the work in Japan was performed by skilled human 
labor for generations. 19
Silk reeling did not demand a large amount of capital investment compared to 
other segments of the silk manufacturing value chain. But silk cocoons, needed to 
produce raw silk and consisting approximately 80% of the total cost, had to be paid in 
cash. Therefore, it was vital for the silk reeling manufacturers to have cash readily 
available during the time when silk cocoons were sold. In Japan, such financing was 
16 Giovanni Federico, An Economic History of the Silk Industry (New York, 2009), 41
17 Italy absorbed technology from advanced countries and regions of the period such as Persia and China. 
Claudio Zanier, Where the Roads Met—East and West in the Silk Production Processes (17th to 19th Century), 
(Italian School of East Asian Studies, Kyoto: 1994), 12-17.
18 We should not underestimate the production technology of silk reeling, which could be much sophisticated 
then usually understood. Ibid., 4. Of course, Japan made major developments and breakthroughs in technology; 
yet they were limited in silkworm raising and silk reeling, not in other processes of the value chain.
19 Today silk reeling is automated with the help of computers.
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provided initially by the wholesale merchants in Yokohama. Subsequently, regional 
banks contributed as well. In both cases, either raw silk (in the case of wholesale 
merchants) or silk cocoons (in the case of regional banks) were used as collateral. 
Warehouses played an important role not only in storing the items but also in issuing 
warehouse receipts that could be legally pledged for credit. A network of large banks, 
and ultimately the Bank of Japan—the central bank—supported such activities. 20
In Italy, however, such type of specialized financing to fund the silk reeling 
manufacturers was less successful. Italy’s silk industry, particularly the silk reeling 
manufacturers, was not satisfied with the financial offerings. 21  Unlike Japan, most of 
the Italian silk industry in the half of the nineteenth century was financed by foreign 
(mostly British) capital. Foreign merchants borrowed the capital and allocated part of 
the proceedings to the Italian wholesale merchants who financed the reeling firms’ 
purchase of silk cocoons. 22  Italy had to wait until a credit system similar to that of 
Japan was envisioned by the foundation of the Magazzini Generali, modelled after the 
London docks in the later part of the nineteenth century. The warehouse used by silk 
merchants and agents before the sale and by weavers to stock their raw material 
before processing it was opened by the Cassa di Risparimo delle provincie lombarde 
(the largest Italian savings bank) in Milan in 1870. Such warehouses specializing in 
silk were established only after the success in Lyons by a group of entrepreneurs. 23 
But the attempt to establish specialized banks that were more considerate of to the 
needs of the trade of silk reeling ultimately failed. Apparently, the Italian banks 
considered that the state of the silk manufacturing business was too risky to lend 
after the 1870s. They were right.
3.　Italy’s Response to Japan’s Rise
Sericulture, the business of silk worm rearing and silk reeling, was “an industry 
20 See, for example, Masaki Nakabayashi, “The Rise of Modern Silk Reeling Industry and Financial Institutions: 
The Formation of the Institution of Providing Advances on Documentary Bills”, Japanese Yearbook on Business 
History 18 (2001) and Aki Kinjo, “Dai jūkyū ginkō no seishi kinyū ni okeru sōko no yakuwari” [The Role of 
Warehouses in Silk Finance by the Nineteenth Bank], Keizai Ronsō, Kyoto University, 189, no.4, 2016).
21 Roberto Toliani, “An Italian Silk Firm on the International Market: the Scotis of Pescia (1815-1860)”, Textile 
History 25, no.1 (1994): 79-113. Stefano Angeli, Proprietari, commercianti e filandieri a Milano nel Primo 
Ottocento, (Franko Angeli, 1982), 120-152. Anna Maria Galli, La Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde 
dalla Fondazione al 1940, (Cariplo-Laterza, 1991), 44-45, 190-191.
22 The illustration of financing the Italian silk industry draws on Federico, An Economic History of the Silk 
Industry, 165-167.
23 One of them is the origin of Credit Lyonnaise, a leading bank in France today.
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which can only survive in countries where labor is abundant, and therefore peasants 
can be satisfied with an extremely low wage”. 24  Japan had plenty of such cheap 
labor, making it very competitive to other rival countries. Japan’s average wage of 
factories workers in silk reeling was approximately half of that of Italy in 1903 and 
early 1910s. 25  The inexpensive labor cost offset the gap in productivity between Italy 
and Japan, which was approximately twofold. In addition, the labor was cheap in the 
countryside due to limited job opportunities and therefore the price of silk cocoons 
was inexpensive. As mentioned before, because silk cocoons consisted approximately 
80% of total cost to produce raw silk, cheap price of cocoons—reflecting low 
opportunity cost of labor—also contributed to offset Italy’s advantage in productivity 
against the Japanese. 26  Japan’s success in sericulture, therefore, was possible by 
leveraging inexpensive yet skilled labor, while improving the efficiency of manual 
work through training and technical advancements.
Industrialization killed sericulture, however. 27  Although the Italians strived to 
increase their productivity in silkworm rearing and silk reeling, their efforts 
ultimately reached a limit. As industrialization progressed in Italy, it brought 
increasing wages: hence, the large opportunity cost of working in sericulture meant 
Italy was no longer capable of competing with the Japanese. The all-time peak in the 
production of cocoons was reached in 1906. 28  Confronting this harsh reality forced 
24 Quoted in 1906 by F. Clerici, a leading Italian sericulture expert. Federico, An Economic History of the Silk 
Industry, 195.
25 Kanji Ishii, Nihon sanshigyō shi bunseki [An analysis of the history of Japan’s sericulture industry], 247-248.
26 Shinya Sugiyama, Japan’s Industrialization in the World Economy 1859-1899, 124. Federico, An Economic 
History of the Silk Industry, 133.
27 Ibid., 101.
28 Federico, An Economic History of the Silk Industry, 100.















1893-95 0.032 2.598 0.083 3.397 2.59 1.31
1904-06 0.048 3.158 0.094 3.280 1.96 1.04
1911-13 0.077 3.602 0.125 3.793 1.62 1.05
Source: Federico, An Economic History of the Silk Industry, 133, Table 7.11
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the Italian silk industry to shift to areas where they still maintained a competitive 
edge against Japan: silk throwing and weaving. The epicenter for such activities was 
in the Como region of Northern Italy. In 1923, approximately two thirds of the 
throwing and weaving factories in Italy were concentrated in this region. 29
Unlike reeling, silk throwing and weaving required capital investment for 
machineries. Throwing and weaving operations required a more reliable entity to 
procure funds from investors beyond the families, friends or founders of the business. 
Thus, from the early 1920s, the Italian silk industry transformed itself from a family 
owned business into corporate entities. In the Lombardia region, where Como is 
situated, the number of joint-stock companies increased from 788 in 1911 to 4,663 by 
1927. Regional banks in Como, such as Populare di Como, Banco Ambrosiano, Banca 
Amaedo & C., Banco Lariano, actively supported these companies by investing as 
shareholders and sending directors to the managing board. These banks contributed 
in transforming the Italian silk industry by sending executives to help manage the 
corporatized manufacturers in addition to financing fixed assets in equipment and 
machinery.
By the 1920s, Italian throwers and weavers had substantially reduced their 
purchasing of domestic raw silk that became too expensive and substituted it with 
imported raw silk from abroad. Japan became the top exporter of raw silk to Italy in 
1922, 27 and 28, and became beneficiaries of rapid changes occurring in Italy. While 
Japan was busy enjoying this new surge in the exportation of raw silk, a paradigm 
shift occurred: the invention of man-made fiber. The surge in synthetic fiber, 
however, did not happen overnight. While the price of synthetic fiber was less than 
approximately a quarter of that of raw silk in 1923, the quality was still greatly 
inferior to that of silk. The Italian silk throwers adapted by mixing the two to 
produce textiles. As a result, Italy thrived in manufacturing thrown silk and weaving 
fabrics, even with the invention of man-made fiber. It is important to note that Italy 
never lost its position as the top exporter of thrown silk from 1863 to 1929, 
consistently commanding a marker share of over 66%. 30  The Italian silk industry 
continued to shift across the value chain by increasing its effort in dying, printing, 
finishing of the fabrics, as well as designing. Such efforts that started in the 1920s 
29 The remainder of this section largely draws on Makiko Hino, “1919～1929 nen ni okeru hokubu italira 
kinuorimonogyou no yushutsu kakudai” [The Expansion of Silk Textile Export in Northern Italy, 1919-1929], 
Socio-Economic History, 78, no.1 (2012): 3-24..
30 Federico, An Economic History of the Silk Industry, 208, Table AVII.
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would bear fruit after World War II with Italy leading the fashion industry. 31
4.　Analysis and Implications
Italy surrendered silk cocoon rearing and silk reeling to Japan. Simultaneously, it 
shifted its efforts on other segments of the value chain. Japan, on the other hand, 
continued on with sericulture, cheering that another competitor had dropped out. To 
be fair, the Japanese did attempt to upgrade their silk industry by building new 
factories and workshops, installing power looms, and establishing joint-stock 
companies to accommodate large investments. Such efforts were notably made in the 
Kiryū district, located 200 kilometers north of Tokyo. 32  This region has been one of 
the most advanced silk weaving districts since the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). 
Unfortunately, Japan lacked the technological heritage that Italy enjoyed, thereby 
lacking the innovations in process, product and organization. As a result, Japan failed 
to become a serious exporter of silk fabrics in the late nineteenth to early twentieth 
centuries. 33
The success of the Japanese in silk reeling forced the Italian manufactures to focus 
on silk throwing and weaving, successfully leveraging the technology that the 
Japanese did not possess. Japan’s competitive advantage was in the abundant supply 
of cheap labor without the accumulation of technology in throwing and weaving. With 
the rise of Japan in silk reeling, Italy, coupled with the Industrial Revolution, no 
longer enjoyed the benefits of cheap labor still available in Japan in comparative 
terms. As a result, Italy moved on to other high valued areas of the silk industry. 
Ironically, as Japan achieved its national goal to advance in industrialization, the silk 
reeling industry was doomed to vanish as a result of wage increase, just like the 
Italian counterpart. In this regard, it is not necessarily the invention of man-made 
fabric that killed Japan’s silk industry, although this narrative is widely told. Rather, 
the increase in human capital caused by the success of the Japanese silk industry 
that facilitated the Industrial Revolution to occur upended the industry.
31 Makiko Hibino, “Repercussions of the Great Depression on the Silk Textile Industry in Northern Italy—
Changes in the industrial structure and responses of Como District”, Osaka University Knowledge Archive 62, 
no.1 (2012): 52-70.
32 Tomoko Hashino and Keijiro Otsuka, “Hand Looms, Power Looms, and Changing Production Organizations: 
the Case of Kiryū Weaving District in Early Twentieth-century Japan”, Economic History Review, 66, no.3 (2013): 
785-804.
33 Japanese silk throwing and weaving prospered by serving the domestic kimono market.
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The exit of a certain segment or an entire industry from the market is a sine qua 
non for opening new grounds to establish a more productive industry. 34  For continued 
economic growth, financers must facilitate replacing unproductive sectors of the 
economy with productive ones. Japanese banks were not able to foresee or facilitate 
the transformation of the silk industry. While Japanese financiers were busy 
successfully funding the working capital to efficiently purchase silk cocoons, the 
Italian counterparts were going through a painful yet necessary change. Because 
Japan was so good at producing raw silk, she did not strategically invest in 
developing technology for advancing other areas of the silk fabric manufacturing 
process. Japan relied on cheap labor as the essence of competitive advantage, which 
history has shown to be unsustainable. Japan was a victim of its own success. 
It is easy to imagine that the transformation of Italy’s silk industry was a painful 
shift. But it was worth the agony. The industry was capable of coping with the 
revolution that occurred in the industry: creation of synthetic fiber. In a 
groundbreaking evolution, the Italian silk industry was able to replace or combine 
silk threads with synthetic fiber. The Japanese silk reeling manufacturers did not 
have such an option. While Japanese financers were effective in funding the growth 
of the silk reeling industry, they failed to prepare for the innovation that would 
change the fundamental structure of the entire silk industry. For the most part, the 
Japanese silk industry vanished. Italy lost its competitive advantage in silkworm 
growing and silk reeling but overcame the disadvantage by moving downstream to 
silk throwing and weaving. Thus, unlike the Japanese, they were able to maintain the 
silk industry and adapt to the invention of synthetic fiber such as nylon. 35
To sum up, the Japanese forced the Italians to unbundle the value chain of silk 
fabric production. Italian banks facilitated the process by understanding and being 
able to lend investment capital in a capital intensive process. With all due respect, 
Japan lacked the technological heritage, know-how, and the financial strength to 
transform the industry. We should by no means undermine the critical importance of 
the success in the Japanese silk reeling industry; without it the modernization of 
34 It is no mystery that heavy industries such as steel and chemicals were the engines of the so-called rapid 
economic growth after World War II.
35 As argued in Makiko Hino, “1919～1929 nen ni okeru hokubu italira kinuorimonogyou no yushutsu kakudai” 
[The Expansion of Silk Textile Export in Northern Italy, 1919-1929], product producers have started aiming 
their position as major exporters of silk products, other than raw silk. Their strategy was to combine silk 
threads with synthetic fiber targeting the mid-market. They effectively cultivated a niche. Currently, Italian 
silk product producers are aiming to the ultimate downstream of the value chain: designing of final products.
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Japan was simply impossible. Nonetheless, the dynamic changes within the Italian silk 
industry illuminate the structural limitations that were inherent in the Japanese 
counterpart.
5.　Conclusion
The vast majority of literature covering the Japanese industrial and financial 
history is heavily focused on silk reeling. This emphasis is quite natural: Japan 
successfully specialized in producing and exporting raw silk for several important 
decades in building a modern nation. Although it is an important process, however, 
silk reeling is only one piece of the entire value chain of silk. This study confronts 
some of the myths and half-truths about the Japanese silk industry. Without the 
invention of man-made fiber—generally perceived as the culprit that destroyed the 
Japanese silk industry—sooner or later, it would have lost its competitive edge due to 
increased wages as the fruit of successful industrialization. Italy exercised the option 
to move to other areas, namely throwing and weaving. Unfortunately, Japan did not 
have the industrial foundation required for technological innovation needed to shift to 
other areas of the silk value chain.
Japan’s march for continued industrialization owed a large degree to the success of 
the silk industry that earned precious hard currency, enabling the nation to purchase 
capital goods and advanced technology from abroad. Industrialization, however, put 
upward pressure on wages. Around the 1910s, the mass consumer market began 
emerging, and department stores, affordable houses with mortgages and amusement 
parks began to emerge in Japan. 36  Thus, it was only a matter of time that Japan’s 
advantage of inexpensive labor would evaporate. Ideally, the Japanese silk industry 
should have moved on, just like the Italians did, to areas where cheap labor was not 
the critical success factor. 37  In that regard, it was not the invention of synthetic fiber 
that killed the Japanese silk reeling industry; it was the victim of remaining 
complacent in overseas silk demand made possible essentially through cheap labor.
Crucially, finance failed to play the role of facilitating or pushing to transform the 
silk industry. Since Japanese financers were focused on providing much needed 
36 Masaru Udagawa and Jun Ikushima, “Toshigata sangyou no tanjou: Kobayashi Ichizō [Birth of a city type 
industry: Ichizō Kobayashi], chap. 6 in Kigyō ka ni manabu keiei’shi [Introduction to Business History in Japan] 
(Tokyo, Yuhikaku: 2011).
37 It is difficult to imagine the Japanese silk fabric industry surviving against synthetic fiber, even without 
World War II that devastated Japan almost entirely.
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working capital, they lacked the levers to aggressively enforce transformation. To the 
contrary, Italian banks lending on a corporate finance basis and not committed in 
funding the purchasing of silk cocoons, were able to push the upgrading of technology 
and the manufacturing process. The fact that both Italian bankers and manufacturers 
shared the knowledge of the entire value chain for silk fabric manufacturing, and 
luckily had or had access to the historical heritage of silk throwing and weaving, 
played a significant role in the transformation of the Italian silk industry. 
Unfortunately, the Japanese financiers, being so focused on funding the silk reeling 
aspect of the industry, were unable to bring about the needed changes. Japan lacked 
the technical heritage that the Italians had accumulated throughout centuries of 
global industry interchanges. The Italian banks, having that advantage, took the 
painful but necessary steps to divert the industry direction by actively abandoning 
past glory. 38
Are there lessons to be learned from the history of the Italian and Japanese silk 
industries? It highlights that industries must anticipate and embrace change and 
incessantly innovate. Change could be painful and controversial. When the business 
appears to be thriving—like the Japanese silk reeling manufacturers at their 
pinnacle— it is often difficult to prepare for radical change. That is why finance has a 
very important role to play to advice and help execute the transformation of 
industries. Financers can, and should, be in a better position to have a more objective 
vantage point than the industrialists who are immersed in the trenches of running a 
business. That, in my opinion, is the role of industrial finance—particularly in the 
developing stage of a nation. 39  Pioneers of industrial finance in Japan, such as the 
Nineteenth Bank in the Suwa region of the Nagano prefecture, home to a large 
cluster of the Japanese silk reeling industry, played a significant role in developing 
the industry from scratch. Yet, they did not poise the Japanese silk industry against 
change waiting just around the corner. Excessive focus on silk reeling and cheap 
labor destroyed the industry. The lessons to anticipate: embrace and confront change 
by constantly advancing the industry.
 （本学教授）
38 Italy, despite the challenges, maintains to have substantive presence in the silk industry. The Como area still 
continues to produce 90% of Italian silk fabrics, and 30% of world market share, by abandoning the mass 
market and targeting only the upper segment. Carlotta Bianchi et al., Il Museo didattico della Seta di Como, 44. 
Companies such as Ongetta s.r.l. produces twisted silk threads in Italy although many of the operations have 
moved to Romania. Web site (retrieved January 3, 2017): http://www.ongetta.eu/inglese/
39 For developed countries, such a role can be provided through an efficient capital market.
